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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this antitrust class action brought by egg purchasers,1 
the plaintiffs claim that egg producers conspired to inflate 
 
1 Claims were also brought by the purchasers of egg 
products, but those claims are not now at issue. 
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prices through three stratagems: (1) early slaughtering of hens 
and similar supply-reducing steps; (2) creation of an animal-
welfare program that was actually designed to reduce the egg 
supply; and (3) coordinated exports of eggs.  Before the 
District Court, the plaintiffs argued that all three of those 
contrivances were part of a single overarching conspiracy that 
was anticompetitive per se and therefore unlawful under the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.  The defendants countered 
that the District Court should look at each alleged stratagem of 
the conspiracy separately and determine whether to apply the 
per se standard for antitrust liability or, instead, the more 
commonly applied rule of reason.  In summary judgment 
briefing, the parties focused on one of the three alleged 
stratagems, and the District Court decided to evaluate it under 
the rule of reason.  The case then proceeded to trial with all 
three stratagems being evaluated under that standard.  
Following the jury’s verdict, the District Court entered 
judgment for the defendants. 
 
The plaintiffs’ primary argument on appeal is that, 
contrary to the District Court’s approach, the alleged 
conspiracy should have been evaluated under the standard of 
per se illegality rather than the rule of reason.  We conclude 




The plaintiffs represent a class of “[a]ll individuals and 
entities that purchased shell eggs produced from caged birds in 
the United States directly from Defendants during the Class 
Period from September 24, 2004 through December 31, 
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2008.”2  (J.A. 125.)  Defendant Rose Acre Farms, Inc. (“Rose 
Acre”), the only defendant left in the case,3 sells shell eggs and 
egg products for the food service industry.  Rose Acre is a 
member of both the United Egg Producers (“UEP”) and the 
United States Egg Marketers (“USEM”), which are trade 
groups representing egg producers.   
 
As noted, the plaintiffs allege that Rose Acre 
participated in a conspiracy to reduce the supply of eggs by a 
variety of means.  First, they say that, during the class period, 
UEP told its members to follow short-term supply-reducing 
recommendations, including slaughtering hens earlier than had 
previously been done, causing hens to molt early,4 and 
reducing the hatching of chickens.  The plaintiffs argue that 
 
2 The plaintiffs representing the class are: T.K. 
Ribbing’s Family Restaurant, LLC, a restaurant in Falconer, 
New York; John A. Lisciandro d/b/a Lisciandro’s Restaurant, 
a restaurant in Jamestown, New York; Eby-Brown Company 
LLC, a convenience store supplier and wholesale food 
distributor based in Naperville, Illinois; and Karetas Foods 
Inc., a Reading, Pennsylvania-based food distributor to 
institutions, restaurants, and retailers.   
 
3 The plaintiffs originally sued several other defendants 
with whom they have since settled.  Rose Acre and two other 
defendants went to trial.  The plaintiffs only appeal the verdict 
as to Rose Acre.     
 
4 “Molting is the process whereby hens lose their 
feathers and regrow them—hens lay no eggs when molting.”  
In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 312 F.R.D. 124, 
130 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (“Processed Egg Prods. I”). 
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those recommendations were explicit production restrictions, 
the purpose of which was to reduce the supply of eggs.   Rose 
Acre does not explain why UEP made those recommendations 
but does emphasize that they were nothing more than 
recommendations.  And, according to Rose Acre, it is unclear 
whether the suggested practices actually did reduce the supply 
of eggs.  For example, Rose Acre contends that early molting 
of a hen would temporarily halt the hen’s egg production for a 
few weeks but should thereafter have increased egg production 
and the life span of the hen.     
 
Second, the plaintiffs allege that a UEP certification 
program (“the Certification Program” or “the Program”) that 
was promoted as a set of measures for animal welfare was 
actually intended to reduce the supply of eggs.  The Program 
required egg producers to put fewer chickens in each cage to 
give the chickens more space.  It also prohibited producers 
from backfilling, that is, replacing caged hens that had died.  
Under the Program, eggs would be labeled as “UEP Certified” 
only if 100% of a producer’s eggs were produced in 
compliance with the Program’s rules.  In response to the charge 
that the Certification Program was designed to drive down 
supply and so drive up prices, Rose Acre says that the Program 
was developed by animal welfare scientists for humane 
purposes and that it did not limit the production of eggs.  Rose 
Acre emphasizes that the Program’s guidelines did not limit 
the number of hens a producer could own, the number of hen 
houses a producer could use, or the number of eggs a producer 
could sell.  Additionally, Rose Acre asserts that the prohibition 
on backfilling did not necessarily reduce the supply of eggs 
because it tends to prevent disease, social competition, and 
stress within a flock – all of which lead to increased mortality 




Third, the plaintiffs contend that UEP conspired with its 
members, through USEM, to collectively export eggs at below-
market prices in order to inflate domestic egg prices.  Rose 
Acre responds that the eggs it exported were surplus eggs not 
ordered by regular customers, and that any price effects were 
transitory because the exports represented such a small 
proportion of the eggs produced. 
 
The plaintiffs’ appeal centers on the standard for 
evaluating the lawfulness of actions taken by Rose Acre and its 
co-defendants.  As more fully described herein, restraints on 
trade are typically judged under what is called the “rule of 
reason,” which basically asks whether, in light of all the 
circumstances in a case, the restraint in question is an 
unreasonable burden on competition.  See infra pp. 13-14.  
Some restraints, however, are so manifestly anticompetitive 
that they do not require extensive analysis and are treated as 
illegal per se.  Whether to apply the rule of reason or the per se 
standard has been one of the hotly-contested issues throughout 
this case.   
 
It first arose, though, in companion cases when certain 
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.  A separate 
set of plaintiffs – the so-called Direct Action Plaintiffs or 
“DAPs” – had decided to file their own antitrust suits rather 
than participate in this class action.  Their cases were then 
consolidated with this one for pre-trial proceedings.  In 
litigating a summary judgment motion in the DAP cases, the 
defendants attacked the allegations related to the Certification 
Program, contending that the Program could not possibly 
constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act.  They argued 
that “[t]he Program and its components are not a naked 
9 
 
restriction on supply, they produce at least plausible 
procompetitive benefits, and they make up a quality standard, 
which itself provides procompetitive benefits to consumers and 
producers.”  (J.A. 2172-73.)  Although that motion for 
summary judgment was filed in the DAP cases, not this one, 
the District Court permitted the representative plaintiffs here to 
file briefing to argue that the per se rule should apply, since the 
same issue was in play in this case.  In their brief, the plaintiffs 
said that the per se rule ought to apply because the defendants 
engaged in a horizontal conspiracy to reduce the supply of eggs 
in order to raise prices.  The plaintiffs also argued that the 
alleged conspiracy had to be looked at as a whole, so it was 
inappropriate to consider the different contrivances of the 
conspiracy separately.   
 
The District Court decided that each individual 
component of the alleged conspiracy could be considered 
separately and that the rule of reason should apply to the 
Certification Program, the only component on which the Court 
was asked to rule.  The Court emphasized that the rule of 
reason is the usual standard for judging allegedly 
anticompetitive actions, and it explained that “[a]llowing the 
plaintiffs’ characterization of the defendant’s conduct as 
comprising a single conspiracy as dispositive for purposes of 
application of per se or rule of reason analysis would 
completely subsume the rule of reason in most, if not all 
circumstances.”  In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 
206 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1040 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“Processed Egg 
Prods. II”).  
 
In rejecting the per se standard, the Court said that the 
“UEP Certifi[cation] Program does not involve an express 
agreement among competitors to restrain supply and … the 
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record contains evidence indicating that the certifi[cation] 
program provided certain procompetitive benefits.”  Id. at 
1045.  The Court indicated that the plaintiffs, despite their 
allegations, had not provided any evidence that the Program 
was an effort to hike prices by restricting the supply of eggs.  
Accepting several defense arguments, the Court declared that 
there were some plausible procompetitive benefits to the 
Program, including that increased cage space, although 
limiting the number of hens, could increase the hens’ 
productivity because they would be healthier and less stressed, 
and that the prohibition on backfilling could reduce disease and 
lead to the production of more eggs.  The Court also observed 
that the Program did not limit the number of hens a producer 
could own or the number of eggs a producer could produce.  
Finally, the Court noted that the supply of eggs went up during 
the class period, and thus the plaintiffs would need to present 
some econometric analysis to explain their contention that the 
national egg supply would have increased more rapidly but for 
the defendants’ conduct.  In light of all that, the District Court 
concluded that the rule of reason, not the per se standard, 
should apply to the Certification Program. 
 
When it came time to try the present case, neither side 
contested the decision that the rule of reason would be used to 
judge the Program, and neither filed a pre-trial motion asking 
the Court to rule on the standard to be applied to the other 
components of the alleged conspiracy.5  Instead, before trial 
 
5 A few months before trial in this case, the plaintiffs 
filed a motion that they styled as a “Motion to Confirm” that 
the per se rule would apply to the claim of an overarching 
conspiracy to reduce supply.  In that motion, they said simply 
that it would be unfair to apply the rule of reason in this case 
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and in response to the Court’s inquiry about whether the 
plaintiffs would ask the jury to find three conspiracies or one 
overarching conspiracy, the plaintiffs said that they were  
 
prepared to try the case under the Rule of Reason 
on the single question of whether there was a 
single conspiracy to reduce the supply of eggs 
and thereby raise prices.  So that it would be just 
a one-question case, whether there was a single 
conspiracy.  Plaintiffs would preserve their right 
to appeal the Court’s earlier determinations on 
the Rule of Reason[.] 
 
(J.A. 1283-84.)  The plaintiffs filed proposed jury instructions 
based on the rule of reason standard.  Their proposed verdict 
form required the jury to determine whether “the conspiracy 
unreasonably restrained trade[.]”  (J.A. 756.)   
 
because they had alleged from the beginning that the 
defendants had engaged in a single conspiracy to reduce the 
supply of eggs, and that, by not filing a motion for summary 
judgment, the defendants had forfeited their chance to argue 
that the rule of reason should apply.  The District Court denied 
the plaintiffs’ motion.  It rejected the forfeiture argument and 
also saw no reason to deviate from its prior determination in 
the DAP cases that the rule of reason applies in assessing the 
UEP Certification Program.  The Court did not rule on whether 
the rule of reason or the per se rule should apply to the 
components besides the Certification Program but rather 
requested that the parties file separate motions on what 
standard should apply to those other components, if the parties 
wanted a ruling.  No party submitted any such motion.  
12 
 
 After a five-week trial, the District Court told the jury, 
among other things, that, in order to rule for the plaintiffs, it 
had to find, “[f]irst, the existence of a contract, combination, 
or a conspiracy between or among at least two separate 
entities[, and s]econd, that the contract, combination, or 
conspiracy unreasonably restrains trade.”  (J.A. 1021.)  The 
Court asked whether the parties had any objection to the 
instructions, and no one objected.  The verdict form asked: 
 
1. Do you find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that there was a single overarching 
conspiracy to reduce supply comprised of all 
three of (1) short term supply recommendations, 
(2) the United Egg Producers (UEP) 
Certifi[cation] Program, and (3) United States 
Egg Marketers (USEM) exports? 
 
2. Do you find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that [the defendants] participated in the 
conspiracy to reduce supply? 
 
3. Do you find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the conspiracy imposed an 
unreasonable restraint on supply? 
 
(J.A. 760.)  The jury answered: “Yes” to question 1 and “Yes” 
as to Rose Acre for question 2.  It answered “No” to question 
3.  Because it found that the conspiracy did not unreasonably 
restrain supply, the jury did not reach the issue of injury.  No 
one objected to the verdict or otherwise voiced concern about 
the consistency of the jury’s answers, and the District Court 




The plaintiffs later filed a motion under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment.  They 
argued that the jury’s finding of the existence of an overarching 
conspiracy to reduce supply was “new evidence” and that it 
mandated the application of the per se rule and entry of 
judgment for them.  The Court was unpersuaded.  It rejected 
the notion that the jury’s verdict constituted evidence.  And it 
again rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the per se standard 
should apply, stating that “the Court’s legal analysis does not 
have to conform to the subsequent jury’s verdict; the jury’s 
verdict is instead an outgrowth of the Court’s legal rulings 
because those rulings create the universe in which the jury 
makes its decisions.”  In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust 
Litig., No. 08-md-2002, 2018 WL 6592990, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 14, 2018) (“Processed Egg Prods. III”).  The Court also 
noted that the plaintiffs “opted to try the case under the rule of 
reason as one overarching conspiracy[,]” after the ruling on the 
applicability of the rule of reason, and that the jury’s verdict 
was “entirely consistent with the rule of reason.”  Id. 
 
This appeal followed.6 
 
 
6 Rose Acre cross-appealed, with its appeal being 
expressly contingent on a decision to vacate the judgment in its 







The plaintiffs’ fundamental position is that the District 
Court erred in determining the rule of reason, rather than the 
per se standard, should guide the antitrust analysis in this case.  
They argue, first, that the Court should not have looked at the 
components of the alleged conspiracy separately, but rather 
was required to look at the defendants’ actions as a single, 
overarching conspiracy, as the plaintiffs alleged.  They next 
argue that, because the alleged conspiracy was a horizontal 
combination to reduce supply and raise prices, the per se 
standard applied.  Finally, they say that, even if the District 
Court did not err in determining before trial that the rule of 
reason was the correct standard, the jury’s finding that Rose 
Acre participated in a single, overarching conspiracy to reduce 
the supply of eggs mandates application of the per se rule and 
judgment in their favor.  We will address each of those three 
 
7 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “The 
selection of a mode of antitrust analysis is a question of law 
over which we exercise plenary review.”  Deutscher Tennis 
Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 829 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010).  
“We review a District Court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) motion 
for relief from judgment for abuse of discretion (except for 
questions of law, which are subject to plenary review).”  United 
States ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. Victaulic 




arguments in turn, all of which are flawed in one way or 
another.8 
 
Before that, however, we highlight the distinction 
between the two modes of analysis at issue, the rule of reason 
and the per se standard of liability.  Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States[.]”  15 U.S.C. § 1.  The 
Supreme Court “has never taken a literal approach to [§ 1’s] 
language.  Rather the Court has repeated time and again that 
§ 1 outlaw[s] only unreasonable restraints.”  Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 884 (2007) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis 
added).  The general analytical approach, then, is to evaluate 
alleged violations of § 1 under the rule of reason.  Id.  That rule 
 
8 Rose Acre argues that the plaintiffs failed to preserve 
their argument that the per se standard applies to the alleged 
conspiracy.  Not so.  The plaintiffs’ briefing in response to the 
motion for summary judgment in the DAP cases – cases 
consolidated for a time with this one – preserved the issue.  The 
District Court expressly allowed the plaintiffs to file a brief in 
which they made the same arguments that they make here: that 
the per se standard applies to the alleged conspiracy and that 
the court must look at the conspiracy as a whole.  The plaintiffs 
also made abundantly clear in numerous filings in this case that 
they believed the defendants’ practices were part of one 
overarching conspiracy that was subject to the per se standard.  
There is no fair basis for finding forfeiture of that argument.  
See Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 
2011) (explaining the criteria for a finding of forfeiture of an 
argument).   
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tells “the factfinder [to] weigh[] all of the circumstances of a 
case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be 
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on 
competition.”  Id. at 885.  Circumstances to consider include 
information about the business, the restraint’s history and 
effect, and the business’s market power.  Id. at 885-86. 
 
 Although the rule of reason is the default mode of 
analysis, some practices so clearly violate § 1 that they are 
deemed unreasonable per se.  “Restraints that are per se 
unlawful include horizontal agreements among competitors to 
fix prices[.]”  Id. at 886.  “To justify a per se prohibition a 
restraint must have manifestly anticompetitive effects and lack 
any redeeming virtue.”  Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, 
and alteration omitted).  Courts have “expressed reluctance to 
adopt per se rules with regard to restraints imposed in the 
context of business relationships where the economic impact 
of certain practices is not immediately obvious.”  Id. at 887.  
Rather, “the per se rule is appropriate only after courts have 
had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue, 
and only if courts can predict with confidence that it would be 
invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of 
reason[.]”  Id. at 886-87 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
A. Evaluating the Separate Components of the 
 Conspiracy 
 
With that in mind, we consider first whether the District 
Court erred in looking at each of the individual components of 
the conspiracy separately.  In arguing that there was error, the 
plaintiffs rely on Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & 
Carbon Corp., in which the Supreme Court criticized the court 
17 
 
of appeals because it had “approached Continental’s claims as 
if they were five completely separate and unrelated lawsuits,” 
rather than all parts of the “basic plan to monopolize the … 
market[.]’”  370 U.S. 690, 698 (1962).  But, as the District 
Court correctly concluded here, Continental Ore does not 
require analysis of the distinct components of a conspiracy as 
if they were an undifferentiated and indistinguishable bunch of 
behaviors.   
 
The Supreme Court’s admonition against 
“compartmentalizing … various factual components” was 
given in relation to a lower court’s assessment of the 
sufficiency of evidence at a trial, and the direction given was 
definitely not that the various stratagems of an alleged 
conspiracy must be evaluated under a single standard.  Id. at 
699.  Quite the contrary.  As our late colleague Judge Edward 
R. Becker (then serving as a District Court Judge) cogently 
explained: 
 
In Continental Ore itself, the Supreme Court 
engaged in a detailed analysis of the record with 
respect to three of the four ventures which the 
Court of Appeals had addressed on their facts, 
concluding with respect to each of the three 
considered separately that there was enough 
evidence of causation to preclude a directed 
verdict.  If the warning against 
“compartmentalizing” an antitrust conspiracy 
case were meant to prevent a court from breaking 
down a plaintiff’s allegation of a “unitary” 
conspiracy into its component parts for purposes 
of analysis, the Court would not have engaged in 
18 
 
the “forbidden” analysis in the very same 
opinion in which it issued the warning.   
 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. 
Supp. 1100, 1167-68 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Becker, J.) (citation 
omitted). 
 
The plaintiffs in the present case nevertheless contend 
that, because they alleged the defendants engaged in a single, 
overarching conspiracy, all of the defendants’ conduct must be 
evaluated under a single standard and, given their allegations, 
it must be the per se standard.  The plaintiffs evidently believe 
that, because they are masters of their complaint, they are also 
masters of the District Court in deciding the analytical 
approach to be taken in the case.  Their power to dictate 
analysis and outcome is not what they wish it were.   
 
When determining what standard to apply, courts are 
required to look at the “economic effect rather than [rely] upon 
formalistic line drawing.”  Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887.  The 
plaintiffs’ characterization of the defendants’ conduct – 
whether as a single overarching conspiracy or as three separate 
conspiracies – does not determine how a court is to assess 
differing actions that the defendants are accused of taking.  
When different stratagems are alleged to have furthered an 
antitrust conspiracy, the court is free to determine which 
analytical standard should apply to each.  It is possible that 
different aspects of an alleged conspiracy can have very 
different economic consequences, and that, accordingly, 
different standards should apply when assessing whether each 
has an unlawful anticompetitive effect.  Cf. id. at 893 (applying 
different analytical standards to different parts of an alleged 
conspiracy, where one part of the alleged conspiracy was 
19 
 
horizontal and one was vertical).  Were it otherwise, the rule of 
reason, which is supposed to be the widely applicable standard, 
could be relegated to the margins.  A plaintiff with a bucket 
full of allegations about behavior rightly subject to the rule of 
reason could easily, by adding a single allegation of behavior 
that is anticompetitive per se, demand per se analysis of the 
whole.   
 
The District Court did not err in rejecting that kind of 
approach.  Courts can consider the differing components of an 
alleged conspiracy separately when determining which mode 
of antitrust analysis to apply. 
 
B. The Certification Program 
 
Turning to the UEP Certification Program – the one part 
of the alleged conspiracy that the plaintiffs have consistently 
argued should be subject to the per se mode of analysis9 – we 
 
9 The plaintiffs never asked the District Court to 
determine whether the rule of reason or the per se standard 
applied to the other two components of the alleged conspiracy, 
namely: (i) the short-term supply-reducing recommendations, 
including early slaughter, early molting, and reduced hatch; 
and (ii) egg exports.  The plaintiffs’ argument has always been 
that the conspiracy was a single overarching conspiracy and 
that the per se standard applied to it as a whole.  Once the 
District Court rejected that theory and determined that the rule 
of reason applied to the Certification Program, the plaintiffs 
never moved to have the Court consider whether the per se 
standard should apply to the other two alleged stratagems.  
Instead, the plaintiffs opted to try the case under the theory that 
20 
 
conclude that the District Court properly applied the rule of 
reason.   
 
The Certification Program was not an express 
agreement to reduce the supply of eggs, much less to fix prices.  
And, notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ protestations, it is not clear 
that the Program would “have manifestly anticompetitive 
effects and lack any redeeming virtue[,]” id. at 886 (citation 
omitted), as must be the case for the per se rule to apply.  
Although the Program required increased cage space and so 
would lead to fewer hens in existing structures, the Program 
did not limit the number of hens or structures a producer could 
have, so producers could increase the number of hen houses 
and add more hens.  And Rose Acre provided evidence that 
hens with more cage space produce more eggs.  Similarly, the 
impact on the supply of eggs of a prohibition on backfilling is 
less than clear, as there is evidence that the prohibition prevents 
disease and social competition and allows hens to live longer 
and produce more eggs.   
 
Moreover, as the District Court said, “while the 
plaintiffs argue that the supply reducing effects of the 
conspiracy are essentially undisputable, the record includes 
evidence that egg supply actually increased during the 
conspiracy period.”  Processed Egg Prods. II, 206 F. Supp. 3d 
at 1047.  Although the plaintiffs assert that the egg supply 
would have increased even more if not for the Certification 
Program, the economic impact of the actions at issue cannot be 
predicted with a high degree of certainty, which is a 
prerequisite for application of the per se standard.  See United 
 
there was one overarching conspiracy subject to rule of reason 
analysis.   
21 
 
States v. Brown Univ. in Providence in State of R.I., 5 F.3d 658, 
670 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) (“Per se rules of illegality 
are judicial constructs, and are based in large part on economic 
predictions that certain types of activity will more often than 
not unreasonably restrain competition[.]”).   
 
Despite that, the plaintiffs argue for that standard, 
relying heavily on the rule that horizontal agreements among 
competitors to fix prices are illegal per se.  Leegin, 551 U.S. at 
886.  According to the plaintiffs, because they allege that the 
defendants engaged in a conspiracy to reduce the supply of 
eggs, the per se standard has to apply.  But, as already 
indicated, the plaintiffs’ choice of labels does not dictate the 
mode for assessing allegations and evidence.  Brown Univ., 5 
F.3d at 670 (“[T]he test for determining what constitutes per se 
unlawful price-fixing is one of substance, not semantics.”).  
The District Court thoroughly considered the plaintiffs’ 
complaint and the record and determined that there was not a 
horizontal agreement to reduce supply and fix prices.  The 
Court was confronted with practices having far less certain 
motives and far more complicated economic consequences, 
and that quite rightly led to application of the rule of reason.  
That choice was correct. 
 
C. The Rule 59 (e) Motion 
 
The District Court also did not err in denying the 
plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
59(e) allows for “[a] motion to alter or amend the judgment.”  
“[A] proper Rule 59(e) motion . . . must rely on one of three 
grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the 
availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear 
error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Wiest v. Lynch, 710 
22 
 
F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).  The 
plaintiffs do not claim that their motion is supported by a 
change in the law.  They do, however, argue that it is justified 
by new evidence and the need to correct a clear error of law 
and an injustice.   
 
They say first that the jury’s verdict constituted “new 
evidence” that effectively supersedes the District Court’s prior 
determination that the rule of reason is the proper mode for 
analyzing the conspiracy.  As the plaintiffs see it, because the 
jury “found that there was, in fact, a single, overarching 
conspiracy to reduce supply,” the verdict cannot be squared 
with application of the rule of reason and instead demands per 
se liability.  (J.A. 771.)  Accordingly, the plaintiffs argue, the 
District Court should have entered judgment in their favor and 
should not have let the jury consider whether the restraints on 
trade were reasonable.   
 
To the extent the plaintiffs are arguing that the jury’s 
verdict is somehow internally inconsistent, they lose.  They 
waived any such argument by failing to object to the verdict 
before the jury was discharged.  See Frank C. Pollara Grp., 
LLC v. Ocean View Holding, LLC, 784 F.3d 177, 191 (3d Cir. 
2015) (“[I]f a party fails to object to an inconsistency in a 
general verdict before the jury is excused, that party waives any 
objection in that regard.”).10  Moreover, the verdict is plainly 
not inconsistent when considered as a product of the rule of 
reason, which is the standard on which the jury was instructed.  
The whole point of the rule of reason is to recognize that there 
are agreements that restrain trade but do not do so 
 
10 No argument has been made that the verdict form 
provided for a special verdict under Rule 49(a). 
23 
 
unreasonably.  That is the very conclusion the jury reached in 
this matter, after hearing five weeks of evidence and argument.   
 
It should be obvious too that the jury’s verdict does not 
constitute “new evidence.”  It is not evidence of any sort.  A 
verdict is “[a] jury’s finding or decision on the factual issues of 
a case.”  Verdict, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  
Evidence, on the other hand, is “[s]omething (including 
testimony, documents, and tangible objects) that tends to prove 
or disprove the existence of an alleged fact; anything presented 
to the senses and offered to prove the existence or nonexistence 
of a fact[.]”  Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  
A jury bases its verdict on evidence; it does not create 
evidence.  A verdict itself is thus not evidence at all, at least 
not in the self-same case.   
 
The plaintiffs fare no better with their assertion that the 
District Court’s decision to apply the rule of reason was a clear 
error of law and an injustice.  They repeat their focus on the 
Supreme Court’s declaration that “[a] horizontal cartel among 
competing manufacturers or competing retailers that decreases 
output or reduces competition in order to increase price is, and 
ought to be, per se unlawful[.]”  Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893.  But 
they skip over the words “in order to,” which is a phrase with 
serious meaning.  When the aim of coordinated action is to set 
higher prices, the per se rule certainly does apply.  The 
plaintiffs, however, failed to prove that kind of intent or 
anticompetitive effect.  Again, the record both before and after 
trial paints a far more complex picture than the black and white 
caricature drawn by the plaintiffs’ argument.  The District 
Court recognized that the rule of reason is the default standard 
and that per se liability is a rare exception, the latter being 
appropriate only when a court has “considerable experience” 
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with the type of restraint at issue and can predict that the 
restraint would be found to be unreasonable under the rule of 
reason in almost all instances.  Id. at 886-87.  In this case, that 
is simply not so.  It cannot be said on this record that the 
complained-of practices are manifestly anticompetitive.       
 
Indeed, the jury’s finding that the restraints on 
competition at issue in this case were reasonable is a good 
indicator that the plaintiffs’ demand for per se liability is off 
base.  The per se rule presumes that a particular restraint is 
unlawful because the restraint is such as would almost always 
restrict competition unreasonably.  Rossi v. Standard Roofing, 
Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 465 (3d Cir. 1998).  A jury is not asked to 
consider the reasonability of the restraint because the 
unreasonableness of it is so plain.  One would think, then, that 
a restraint properly subject to the per se standard, if tried under 
the rule of reason, should ordinarily be found to be 
anticompetitive.  But the jury here determined that the 
complained of practices were actually reasonable, rather than 
an effort to drive up prices.  That it also found the defendants 
had some agreement to reduce supply does not mean, either as 
a matter of logic or law, that the District Court erred in saying 
that the rule of reason was the proper mode of analysis.   
 
The plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion is really just a 
recasting of their argument that any brake on expanded supply 
is illegal per se.  They proposed a verdict form requiring the 
jury to determine whether Rose Acre participated in a 
conspiracy to reduce the supply of eggs and, if so, whether that 
“conspiracy unreasonably restrained trade.”  (J.A. 756.)  But, 
throughout this litigation, they have never wanted an answer to 
that second question.  Their position has always been that the 
answer to the first question is alone dispositive.  As already 
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discussed, however, that is not the law, and the plaintiffs are 
not entitled to undo the jury’s verdict simply because they 
would rather have liability presumed than proven.  The District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying their motion to 




The District Court did an admirable job in addressing 
the myriad legal issues presented in this complex case and in 
presiding at trial.  The plaintiffs’ last-ditch effort to overturn 
their loss is unsupportable.  For the reasons stated, we will 
affirm. 
